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Defendants' and Gross-respondents' Brief
STATEMENT OF FACTS

The procedural notes and statement of facts as contained in cross-appellant's brief need additional comment
and amplification. Cross-respondent, Geneva Rock Products Company, will submit another brief in Civil No. 20,-
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592 in answer to the separate brief of cross-appellant filed
in that case.
The three groups of eight notes and mortgages specified by Cross-appellant as having been placed of record on
February 5th, 13th and 18th, 1957, all recite on their face
that they weTe given for "an actual loan" of the amount
there set forth (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 1-24). When the complaint of plaintiff, Utah Savings and Loan, was filed to foreclose the mortgages involved herein, the amount set forth
as due plaintiff was the original amount of the notes and
mortgages, $13,500.00 in each case (R. 7-35). However,
at the outset of the trial, a stipulation was entered into between plaintiff and defendant, Mecham, which reduced the
amount claimed 10% as to each of the twenty-four causes
of action ( R. 121, 122) .
The mortgages are all blank form mortgages, mortgagee's name having been typed onto the form and no officer of mortgagee signed its name to any provision of the
notes or mortgages (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 1-24). Neither
the notes or mortgages ·contain any recitals of an agreement on or direction in the manner of advancing any funds
in the future, nor was there any separate written agreement between mortgagee and mortgagor concerning the
advancement of funds in the future or at any time (Plaintiffs' Exhibits 1-24; Tr. 141-143). Cross-appellant did not
allocate any funds to the use of Robert B. Mecham, or set
up a special account in his name, to cover any futw--e advancements made to him (Tr. 83, 92, 93). The money advanced to Mecham was drawn against cross-appellant's
general account at the Walker Bank & Trust Company in
Provo (Tr. 98).
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The amounts claimed by the cross-respondents, Geneva Rock Products Company, Central Utah Block Co., and
Masonry Specialties & Supply is as stated in cross-appellant's brief. As indicated in said brief, notices of Mechanics Liens were filed timely, and while no segregation was
made of the amount furnished to any individual structure,
materials in said amounts were proved to have been delivered to and used in the improvements on the property in
this case (Tr. 657-678; Tr. 679-695; R. 171, 172). Regarding
the lien of Geneva Rock Products Company, cross-appellant
entered into a stipulation which segregated the amount
claimed in said lien between the Rowley and La Mesa properties (R. 171, 172). No other materialmen or lien claimant
objected to the failure on the part of these materialmen to in
any way segregate the amount claimed in their liens as to
particular improvements or between any given properties,
and cross-appellant acquiesced in this segregation of Geneva Rock Products Company thereby admitting that it
was in no ·way prejudiced by Geneva's failure to make any
segregation.
It is to be noted that at the time the cross-respondents'
Mechanic's Liens were filed, the La Mesa property had not
been subdivided, the subdivision not having been completed
and filed of record until January 24, 1958, nearly one year
after construction had begun and over six months after mechanic's liens had been filed (Tr. 792) (Defendants' Exhibit 107).
Defendant and cross-respondent, Central Utah Block
Company, filed its lien on September 3, 1957, for the sum
of $15,078.72, the unpaid bal·ance of Mecham's account.
It furnished and delivered materials for both Rowley and
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LaMesa subdivisions together with several other areas and
subdivisions that Mecham was building homes for the
plaintiff, Utah Savings and Loan (Defendant's Exhibit 110).
The description used in the lien was a metes and bounds description and the only accurate description available to rna-·
terialmen and defendants at the time of the filing of the
liens for the subdivision plat of LaMesa when it was finally made of record and the individual mortgage descriptions of plaintiff were in direct conflict and there were lags
and gaps as between these several descriptions (Defendants' Exhibit 118).
Defendants could not segregate materials per lot for
the lots were not marked at the times of delivery and the
materials delivered were used interchangeably among the
various houses; no materials were returned by Mecham
to defendants (Defendants' Exhibit 110). Defendant, Central Utah Block, furnished materials for all the houses in
La Mesa (Tr. 707).
Prior to the ·commencement of the law suit, Central
Utah Block Company discovered that the lien description did
not include the porperty known as Rowley and that in fact
it couldn't claim a lien on the Rowley subdivision for the
reason that the legal description used did not cover the Rowley property and it was too late in time to file on the Rowley property. The street addresses of Rowley and LaMesa
were very similar and hence the unintentional error of including materials used in Rowley among the materials liened
on the LaMesa subdivision (Defendants' Exhibit 110). Central Utah Block mistakenly thought that the metes and
bounds description in the lien included the Rowley property. Upon discovery of this, defendant, Central Utah
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Block Company, reduced its claim by motion before the
cotu1: and previously informed plaintiffs of this fact before
the 1notion was made (Defendants' Exhibit 110).
Central Utah Block Company's estimate of material
used in LaMesa on subsequent inspection was $13,276.55
(Tr. 710). Invoices showed materials for $11,793.64 (Defendants' Exhibit 110). This discrepancy in the estimate
and invoices is due to the interchanging in use of materials
among jobs by Mecham.
The President of cross-appellant association, D. Spencer Grow, visited the La Mesa property during the first week
after construction eommenced, and then observed that labor and material were improving the property and that
cross-respondents' liens had attached (Tr. 542-543) (Plaintiffs' Exhibit 45). At this time, approximately $73,400.00
had been advanced by cross-appeHant to Mecham (mortgagor>
(Defendants' Exhibit 70). Defendants' Exhibit
70 is a summary of the loans in process, ledger cards of
cross-appellant, and as such show the amounts advanced
on each structure and the dates same were made. The total amount ultimately advanced was the sum of nearly
$324,000.00 (Defendants' Exhibit 70; Tr. 78).
This appeal taken by cross-appellant, Utah Savings
and Loan Association, relates solely to the priority accorded
to and validity of cross-respondents' mechanics' liens.
STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
IN AN EQUITY PROCEEDING. THE APPELLATE
COURT WILL NOT DISTURB THE FINDINGS AND
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JUDGMENT O·F THE TRIAL COURT UNLESS THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY PREPONDERATES AGAINST IT.
POINT II
THE RECORD IN THIS CASE CONCLUSIVELY
SUPPORTS THE TRIAL CO·URT'S FINDINGS THAT
THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT BETWEEN MO·RTGAGOR AND MORTGAGEE C·ONCERNING FUTURE
ADVANCE.MENT OF THE MO·RTGAGE PROCEEDS,
AND THAT SUCH ADVANCES WHEN IN FACT MADE
WERE O·PTIONAL WITH AND AT THE DISCRETION
OF THE MORTGAGEE, AND THEREFORE, SUBORDINATE TO INTERVENING LIENS OF WHICH MORTGAGEE HAD NO·TICE.
POINT III
THJE MECHANICS' LIENS OF CROSS-RESPONDENTS ARE VALID AND ENFORCEABLE ALTHOUGH
THEY DO NOT MAKE A SEGREGATION OF THE
AMO·UNTS OF MATERIAL WHICH WENT INTO EACII
PARTICULAR IMPROVEMENT.
POINT IV
THE RECORD CONCLUSIVELY SUPPORTS THE
COURT'S FINDING THAT CENTRAL UTAH BLOCK
COMPANY UNINTENTIONALLY INCLUDED MATERIALS IN ITS LIEN THAT WERE DELIVERED BY CENTRAL UTAH BLOCK CO:MPANY TO THE PROPERTY
OTHER THAN THAT DESCRIBED IN ITS LIEN AND
THAT APPEDLANTS WERE IN NO WAY PREJUDICED AS A RESULT THEREBY.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
IN AN EQUITY PROCEEDING, THE APPELLATE
COURT WILL NOT DISTURB THE FINDINGS AND
JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL CO~URT UNLESS THE EVIDENCE CLEARLY PREPONDERATES AGAINST IT.
This is an equity proceeding, and the judgment of the
trial court is not to be disturbed unless the evidence clearly
preponderates against it. Peterson v. Holloway, 334 P2d
559; Nokes v. Continental Mining and Milling Co., 308 P2d
954. Also, deference is given the advantageous position of
the trial court in making determinations of fact based upon
observations of witnesses and noting their demeanor and
credibility. Peterson v. Holloway, supra.
POINT II
THE RECORD IN THIS CASE C0'NCLUSIVELY
SUPPORTS THE TRIAL CO·URT'S FINDINGS THAT
THERE WAS NO AGREEMENT BETWEEN MORTGAGOR AND MORTGAGEE CO~NCERNING FUTURE
ADVANCEMENT 0'F THE MO,RTGAGE PROCEEDS,
AND THAT SUCH ADVANCES WHEN IN FACT MADE
\VERE OPTIONAL WITH AND AT THE DISCRETION
OF THE MORTGAGEE, AND THEREFORE, SUBORDINATE TO INTERVENING LIENS O·F WHICH MORT·
GAGEE HAD NO~TICE.

Cross-appellant in its brief cited some of the leading decisions which announce the controlling law on the issue of
priorities which is before this Court Cross-respondents subSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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mit that where mortgagee advances mortgage loan proceeds
to the mortgagor, and such advances are made at mortgagee's option and discretion, and without a legal obligation so to do, then such advances as they occur are subordinate to the intervening encumbrances of materialmen
of which mortgagee had actual notice. Elmendorf-Anthony
Co v. Dunn, 116 P2d 253 (Wash), W. P. Fuller Co. v. McClure, 191 P 1027 (Calif), American Law of Property Vol.
IV Sections 16.70 et seq. It is to be noted that the Elmendorf and Fuller cases, Supra, and most decisions cited there
involve Situations where there is an agreement pertaining to
future advances and the courts are called upon to construe
them to determine whether they are optional with or obligat~ry upon mortgagee. In the case before this Court there is
no such agreement, either in the notes and mortgages, by independent written agreement or oral understanding.
The theories supporting the priority of mortgages for
future advancements over subsequently attaching liens in
situations where there is an agreement governing future advances, is that the original agreement providing for such
future advances is construed as a promise by the mortgagor
to repay any and all sums advanced both at the time the
agreement and mortgage are executed as well as at any later
dates when such advances are made pursuant to the agreement for future advances. In situations where there is an
obligatory agreement for future advances there is no separate independent promise arising as each sum is advanced.
After developing this theory the text writers of the American Law of Property, Vol. IV, state in conclusion to Section 16.71 at Page 135, the following:
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"One conS€quence of the foregoing general proposition
is that the original mortgage agreement must provide
for the future advances. If it does not, attempts to
m~ !~e it cover later r..dvances \vill be treated as separate and distinct transactions subject to independent
tests as to their validity and will not partake of the
priority of the original mortgage."
Hence, where there is no legally binding agreement to make
future advances there can be no obligation on mortgagee
to·advance sums in the future, and any such advances must
be construed as separate and distinct transactions, Ex parte
Whitbread,- 19 Ves. 209, 34 Eng. Rep. 496.
The record in this case is clear that there is no written
document to which the cross-appellant can point by which
it obligated itself to make future advances of any money to
n1ortgagor, Robert B. Mecham, the only individual who
signed the notes and mortgages. There was no collateral
writing covering any future advances to Mecham, and cross-·
respondents submit that the trial court rightly found that
there was in fact no such agree~ment existing which in any
way obliged cross-apellant to make advances to Mecham.
Cross-appellant acknowledges this in ·their argument in
Polnt I and II of their brief. Their position, as stated there,
is ". . . that when the notes and mortgages were executed
by Meeham in favor of cross-appellant . . . there immediately arose, in law, a correlative obligation to disburse
the money to Mecham as construction progressed on the·
houses . . ." (Cross-appellant Brief, Point I, page 11) .
Again in cr~appella-11t's brief it is stated that the
"
. agreement to disburse the loan proceeds (was) implied by. lauy, . . . " (Cross-appellant Brief, Point II, Page
13). It is submitted that the cross-appellant could not find
r

'

•
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in the record that any reasonable implied in fact agreement
concerning the advancement of loan proceeds to Mecham
could be spelled out, and now seek to found in legal theory
an obligation to advance money on its part on the basis of
Quasi Contract, or that which the law says must be done
although parties have not agreed between themselves that
such must be done, or even then just how it is to be done.

The 24 notes and mortgages recite thast they are given
by mortgagor for an actual loan in the sum of $13,500.00
(Plaintiffs' Exhibit 1-24). This recital is a false statement
of fact since no one disputes but that the money listed on
the notes and mortgages was advanced periodically over a
six-month period (Defendants' Emibit 70). No officer of
the Utah Savings and Loan Association signed any document purporting to be an agreement as to the method of
making the advances to the mortgagor, Robert B. Mecham
(Plaintiffs' Exhilbit 1-24) (Tr. 141-143). There was, in fact,
no systematic or regular procedure in making any or all
advances of Mecham (Tr. 536). At no time after the execution of the notes and mortgages did cross-appellant earmark any funds for the exclusive use of the mortgagor, nor
was any reserve set up out of the assets of Utah Savings
and Loan to be specifically used in behalf of mortgagor,
Robert B. Mecham (Tr. 83, 92, 93, 97, 98, 99). ·No attempt
was made to advance money to Mecham on the basis of a
rate of construction on any of the homes being built in the
La Mesa subdivision. Although in prior dealings in Keyyridge, this was in fact governed by written agreement (Defendant's Exhibits 42-1 to 58) (Tr. 314-315) (Tr. 555-557).
The Court's attention is called to the following testimony given by D. Spencer Grow, President of Utah Savings
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& Loan Association, as developed on cross examination November 17, 1958, early in the trial. The following is quoted
from the transcript of testimony, and is found beginning at

page 141.
"Q. Now, did you have any agreement with Mecham, other than that, that is contained in these mortgages for advancement of this money on these mortgages?
A. No. We didn't have any specifi·c agreement.
The general agreement was this: That he build a house
and get it finished in a reasonable time and get it sold
as rapidly as he could, and the funds would be advanced
to him. as near as we could, along with his needs and
with the rate of ·construction.
Q. But there was no agreement between Uath
Savings and Loan Association and Mecham governing
the advancement of these mortgage proceeds, other
than that which is contained in these written documents?
A. Not to my knowledge.
Q.. And i.f there had been one you would have
known of it, wouldn't you?
A. I would think so.
Q. That is true of the mortgages on La Mesa too,
isn't it?
A. I think that is correct.
Q. It is a fact that the only agreement between
Utah Savings and Loan Association and Robert Mecham
was the agreement contained in the written mortgages?
A. Well, I don't think there is any-I don't think
-the agreement was this: That we would advance the
funds if the work progressed satisfactorily. (Emphasis
supplied).
Q. You would advance the funds if the work
progressed satisfactorily?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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A. That is right. If he discontinued t1he building, we would, naturally, discontinue advancing funds.
Q. If' the work was not satisfactory to Utah Savings and Loan Association, you would not advance the
funds, is that correct? (Emphasis supplied).
A. I think that would be generally correct. (Emphasis supplied) .
Q. So it would be up to Urtah Savings and Loan
Association to determine whether the money should
or should not be advanced on the mortgages?
A. Well, we have-all financial institutions have
an obligation. There are two .parties to a mortgage,
in my opinion, the one that borrows and the one that
supplies the money.
Q. Now, my question is, Mr. Grow, did you have
any understanding _with Mecham for the advancement
of these mortgage fuJJ.ds, other than is represented by
these ·written ocuments?
A. Well, if we did, anything specific, I am not
aware of it. (Emphasis supplied).
(Discussion off the record).
MR. YO·UNG. Your witness.
MR. BULLOCK: That is all.
MR. YOUNG: You may step down."
This testimony shows that there was no agreement between the Utah Savings and Loan Association and Meeham
concerning the future advancement of funds under these
mortgages. The mortgagor, Robert B. Mecham, testified
that after his method of financing his building for crossappellant changed from a contract arrangement, to a mortgage arrangement,· that he, in obtaining money to pay his
bills, had weekly meetings with the president of cross-appellant, ID. Spencer Grow, in his office at Provo wherein
Mecham's bills and lists of creditors were shown to Mr.
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Grow, and lengthy discussions ensued regarding the amount
of money Mecham was to be permitted to draw for that
week (Tr. 209-210) (Tr. 99). We quote from Mecham's
testimony, page 209 and 210 of the transcript as follows:
"Q. As you picked up the check from Mr.Adams to
pay your payroll, did you know to what mortgages the
particular checks were charged?
A. I knew that at this particular time there was
no money left on Keyyridge; most of the money was
gone from Schauerhammer; so the only logieal place
was from La Mesa or the Rowley houses.
Q. Will you tell us how you got the money? The
procedure you went through to get the money to meet
the payrolls?
A. Each week I would go to Utah Savings and
sit and wait for Mr. Grow. Finally, we got together,
and I would ask him for the money, and in twn he
would tell Mr. Adams to give me the money if he-if Mr. Grow saw fit. However, there were some instances where Mr. Grow wasn't there and it was necessary to go directly to Mr. Adams.
Q. Now, how would your trip to Utah Savings
and Loan Association to get money for your payroll
differ from your trips to Utah Savings and Loan Association to get money to pay for materials?
A. As far as I can see, orff-hand, there would be
no difference, other than I would be asking for more
money; that would mean a longer session.
Q. Do you recall any particular trip that you
made to Utah Savings and Loan to get more money
for either labor or materials?
A. I am sure I could recall many instances if I
took the time to do so.
Q. Take a few moments and see if you can recall
one.
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A. Well, I guess I will never forget the time that
I went in and wound up by mortgaging my own house

to meet the payroll.
Q. When was that?
A. That was just about to the end of our work·
about the time we quit. I think, just guessing, I would'
say it would be about three or four weeks before we
actually stopped.''
This procedure continued throughout the construction
in the Rowley and La Mesa areas. According to the testimony of John Adams, the chief accountant for cross-app~llant, D. Spencer Grow, advised him in most instances as
to the amount of money to advance to Mecham, and in
what way to charge the advancements of.f against the properties (Tr. 38-39) (Tr. 99). Adams' testimony shows that
there was no settled arrangement or system on advances
or charging the money against the property (Tr. 39, 70,
71). He also stated that at times during Mr. Grow's abse~ce, he made advances and allocations on his own and
without much regard to any state of completion in any of
the projects the money was advanced· for (Tr. 38). Mr.
Adams also testified that on two occasions he issued -payments directly to material suppliers, from the Utah Savings
and Loan office (Tr. 103, 104).
The Court's attention is called to the stipulation by
cross-appellant and defendant Mecham reducing the amount
claimed, 10% in each of the 24 notes and mortgages (R.
121, 122). A reference to defendant's Exhibit 70 shows
that on January 31st, 1957, 10% of the total amount
"loaned" on the first eight tracts in La Mesa, was shown to
ha_ve been "advanced" to some of D. Spencer Grow's ·corporations, to pay certain obligations "owed" by the mort-
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gagor for planning services related to his building venture
on the La Mesa tract (Tr. 324, 325). Cross-appellant would
have us believe that this advancement, and similar advancements made when each of the other set of eight mortgages
were executed and put of record were obligatory. Crossappellant also argues that the statement of a definite sum
in the mortgage and note limits its total obligation, and
makes it obligatory upon the plaintiff to advance up to that
amount. However, during the course of the trial, plaintiff
was able to reach into the pocket of the corporations to
which this money was advanced, retrieve it and credit it
back to the mortgagor and end up claiming only $12,150.00
principal on each note and mortgage (R. 121-122). This
seems the best evidence that there was nothing obligatory
about the arrangement between mortgagee and mortgagor
as to the advancement of moneys. Nothing in the record
pertaining to this 10~~i discount shows that Mecham agreed
to pay it or any sum for planning services (Tr. 544-550) (Tr.
325). When an advancement can be made, not to the mortgagor, but to discharge the mortgagor's debts to a third party, and that advancment can be retrieved, surely there could
be no binding obligation to make such an advance. If the
plaintiff is not claiming this $32,400.00 as due and owing under the notes and mortgages, then it seems apparently clear
that the sum was not, in fact, advanced (Tr. 550). If this
is the true fact, then cross-appellant by its own act of ·bringing this action and in now claiming less than the full amount
of the notes and mortgages, has clearly shown that it was
not obligatory upon it to advance the full amount df the
notes and mortgages. Whichever way the matter is viewed,
and I submit it is open to speculation as to just where the
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~32,400.00 is, it is clear that any arrangement between the

parties for future advancements was purely optional with
the mortgagee as to amount, the time made, and to whom
any sums of money would be payable, if at all.
POINT III
THE MECHANICS' LIENS OF CROSS-RESPONDENTS ARE VALID AND ENFO,RCEABLE ALTHOUGH
THEY DO NOT MAKE A SEGREGATION OF THE
AMOUNTS OF MATERIAL WHICH WENT INTO EACH
PARTICULAR IMPRO,VEMENT.

Cross-appellant claims that by virtue of Title 38-1-8,
U.C.A. {1953) the liens of Geneva Rock Products Co. and
Masonry Specialities & Supply are invalid because they fail
to make a segregation of amounts of material going into
each particular improvement. It is to be noted that the
above cited statute does not make any distinction regarding contiguous or non-contiguous property. It authorizes
including in one claim {lien) claims against "two or more
buildings . . . owned by the same person or persons . . . "
The requirement of stating the amount due on each
such building has been before this Court in the case of
Eccles Lumber Co. v. Martin, 31 U. 241, 87 P. 713, where
it was held that a lien acquired with the consent of the
owner of the property should not be defeated where no
rights of others are infringed. This Court in that case said
that the segregation provision of the statute was for the
protection of lien claimants of the san1e class (material or
labor) so that no one will overburden a single property.
The Court in the Eccles case states:
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''A discrimination must be made between the things
that are necessary to acquire a lien and those that are
J~ercly intended to protect the interests of the lien
claimants bet\veen or among themselves. The statement in Section 1387, as \Ve view it, clearly belonged
to the latter class."
Section 1387 is a reference to an earlier Utah Statute
similar to Title 38-1-8, U.C.A., 1953. The case of Henrichson v. Bertelson, 35 P2d 318, (Calif.) cited by ·cross-appellant holds that where the materialman and the contractor
make an agreement for the former to supply the entire project or projects of the contractor then a single lien covering all such improvements is proper and enforceable. The
testimony in the instant case bears out this theory since
as to Geneva Rock Products, the agreement with Mecham
was for cement to be furnished at all Mecham's projects
at a stated price (Tr. 658-59).
The case of Garner v. Van Patten, 20 U. 290, 58 P.
684, cited by cross-appellant holds that where to make a
segregation of amounts due on each particular improvement requires doing a very difficult and near impossible
thing, compliance with the statute would not require such
a task. As to cross-respondent, Masonry Specialties this
\vould have been almost impossible (Tr. 683). The contractor made no request for any segregation of materials
as to each improvement (Tr. 683). It would have likewise
been impossible for cross-respondent, Geneva Rock, to allocate between the various improvements, since loads were
split up from house to house over the various projects (Tr.
664) (Tr. 669-71).
It is to be noted that neither the lien of cross-respondents, Geneva Rock, or Masonry Specialties claims the total
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amount stated therein against each improvement, or separately described tract as was the situation in the Garner
case (Defendants' Exhibit 105 and 99). Also the ownercontractor Mecham received title to the La Mesa property
in a single description, and when these liens were filed the
property had not been subdivided into the separate lots as
expressed in plaintiffs' mortgages (Defendants' Exhibit
107).
It is submitted that these authorities and facts sustain the validity of the liens of cross-respondents, since it
is clear that the notice required by the statute was given,

and the manner of stating the claim has prejudiced no one.
Any possible prejudice or objection to the lien of Geneva
R9Ck was waived by cross-appellant when it entered into
the stipulation with Geneva Rock \Vhich makes a segregation between the La Mesa and Rowley property, as well
as other areas which contractor ordered material for (R.
171-173). The evidence also supports the single lien theory in that the evidence supports the conclusion that the
parties treated the Rowley-La Mesa area as an entire construction unit or project (Tr. 195-97) (Tr. 658-59) (Tr. 200)
(Tr. 252) (Tr. 554-57). The case of Eccles Lumber Co. v.
1\lartin, Supra, supports this theory.

The trend of decisions by this Court regarding compliance with requisites of Mechanics' Lien statutes is substantial compliance with the statute to the end that no
prejudi·ce results from an omission. Beuhner Block Co. v.
Glezos, 6 U. 2d 226, 310 P2d 517.
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POINT IV
THE RECORD CONCLUSIVELY SUPPORTS THE
COURT'S FINDIN·G TI-IAT CENTRAL UTAH BLOCK
COMPANY UNINTENTIOI'.JALLY IrJCLUDED MATERIALS IN ITS LIEN THAT WERE DELIVERED BY CENTRAL UTAHJ BLOCK COMPANY TO THE PRO,PERTY
OTHER THAN THAT DESCRIBED IN ITS LIEN AND
THAT APPELLANTS WERE IN NO WAY PREJUDICED AS A RESULT THEREBY.
The evidence is clear that the erroneous overstatement
of Central Utah Block Company's lien was unintentional,
without any semblance of intent to defraud, and that the
PLAINTIFF O·R ANY OTHER PARTY TO THIS ACTION WAS NOT PREJUDICED IN ANY WAY, FORM
OR MANNER AS A RES·U:LT THEREO'F.
The evidence is clear that a minimum of $13,276.55
worth of materials were used in the La Mesa property and
the amended lien asked for $11,800.00. When the error
was discovered at one of the several pre-trial conferences,
all parties to this action were notified and Central Utah
Block Company moved to amend its complaint and lien.
The court rightfully granted the motion.
The unintentional error arose because of the similar
street addresses of Rowley and La Mesa properties (Def.
E:m. 110), and the fact that Central Utah Block Company
thought that the metes and bounds description used in the
lien covered the La Mesa and Rowley properties. In addition, a $5,000.00 check of Mr. Mecham came back insufficient funds and this reversal entry wasn't picked up until after the lien was filed and reviewed at the pre-trial
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conference.

The lien was filed for the unpaid balance of

Mr. Mecham's account with Central Utah Block Company,
$15,078.72, and was erroneously assumed to be all due on
the last property delivered to, to-wit, La Mesa, as evidenced
by Central Utah Block Company's invoices and exhibits

(Def. E:x!h. 109, 110, 111).

The authorities are clear that honest, unintentional
errors without intent to defraud and where no one is MISLED OR PREJUD1ICED do not invalidate a lien. 57 Cor-

pus Juris Secundum 676, Section 153, Subsection b; Drake
Lumber Company v. Paget Mortgage Company, Oregon,
(1954), 247 P. 2d 804; 36 Am. Jur. 107, Sec 158.
It is interesting to note that Plaintiffs FAIL to show
any claim or evidence that they or any other party to this
action have been prejudiced or defrauded in any respect.
tn fact, they have been aided, for the reason that the claim

was reduced and not increased.
The above authorities require that there be BOTH
FRAUD AND PREJUDICE to the parties before they declare a lien invalid on this basis. It is uncontroverted that
none of the parties herein were prejudiced.
CONCLUSION

The trial court's findings and the judgment based
thereon are clearly supported by the evidence, and the validity and priority of the cross-respondents' mechanics' liens
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as found and determined by the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
GEORGE E. BALLlF
fi. GRANT IVINS

and
THOMAS TAYLOR
Attorneys for Cross-respondents
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